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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. * LIGNELL,. his wife, BURTON M. 
TODD and PHYLLIS h'. TODD, * 
his wife, 
* Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
* 
1-t r;? .' ly'fg 
v. * 
CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM * Case No. 15001 
R. BERG, a partnership, dba 
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
* COMPANY, and FIDELITY AND 
DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 
* 
a corporation, 
* 
Defendants and 
Respondents. * 
ADDITIONAL PAGES 13-18 
Plaintiffs are aware of no provision of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that would permit Defendants-Respondents 
to file a written supplement to either their oral argument 
or their brief after the day of argument.l If, however, the 
Court is inclined to consider Defendants' "additional pages" 
Plaintiffs submit the following to correct the erroneous con-
elusions contained therein. 
Apparently Defendants, and possibly the Court, miscon-
strued the thrust of Plaintiffs' argument relating to attorney's 
lRule 75(p) (3), U.R.C.P., authorizes corrections, but 
not supplements. 
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fees. In this regard it is essential that the distinction be-
tween attorney's fees awarded as costs (§14-2-3) and attorney's 
fees awarded as damages be kept in mind. Plaintiffs readily 
concede that both Defendants pleaded an entitlement to attor-
ney's fees ("costs") under §14-2-3. (Plaintiffs attached 
copies of Defendants' counterclaims as an appendix to their 
Supplemental Brief.) Plaintiffs contend, however, that §14-2-3 
does not authorize an award of attorney's fees on a Performance 
Bond and thus Defendants would not be entitled to any award of 
attorney's fees, either below or on appeal, based upon that 
statute. Further, Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership) 
was not, as Defendants claim, the principal on that bond. The 
principal was Berg Construction Company (the joint venture). 
Plaintiffs' second argument relates to Defendants' claim 
that they are entitled to pass over to the Plaintiffs those at-
torney's fees awarded to the subcontractors. As Plaintiffs 
understand Defendants' contention they are seeking this pass 
through not as costs under §14-2-3 but as damages for breach 
of contract. 
At oral argument Plaintiffs contended that the action of 
the trial court awarding over the subcontractors' attorney's fees 
was improper since Defendants failed to plead attorney's fees 
as an element of their damages and provided no proof of this 
matter (as damages) at trial; further, the Court2 made none of 
2Defendants erroneously contend in their "additional 
pages" that plaintiffs asserted there were "no • • • findings 
by Defendants-Respondents." 
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the necessary findings that would sustain such an award as 
damages (see Plaintiffs' Supplemental Br;ef), d · ~ an , ~n any event, 
that it was the duty and province of the jury to award defendants 
their damages for the contract breach and it made no award of 
attorney's fees. 
Defendants' argument that they pleaded an entitlement 
to attorney's fees does not solve the rest of the deficiencies 
relating to the award over; nevertheless, it has the potential 
of creating a gross misunderstanding with this Court. 
Even in its supplement, Surety does not contend that it 
made any claim for attorney's fees other than on the Performance 
Bond under §14-2-3. Berg Brothers Construction (the partnership) 
claims, however, that it did make such claims. A review of the 
record indicates that the purported "cross-claim" against the 
owners relating to the Comstock-Murray Electric action was never 
served on plaintiffs or their counsel; rather, it was mailed to 
Ron Spratling, attorney for Murray-Comstock (R. D31); thus, 
clearly there was no properly pleaded claim over that would 
sustain the pass through of the $21,000 in attorney's fees award-
ed the electricians, even if the other shortcomings did not 
exist. 
With relation to the drywallers' claim Berg apparently 
did file a claim over. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss that claim 
prior to trial (R. C780-781). That matter was argued July 16, 
1976, and is reported in pages 25-36 of the Supplemental Trans-
cript (blue backing). Plaintiffs there argued that any kind of 
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a pass through to them was improper because a bond had been 
posted which met the requirements of §14-2-2. Defendants 
stated that the cross-claim was intended to deal only with the 
matter of extras under the construction contract and was simply 
filed so that any extras proved by the subcontractors against 
Berg would be considered in the overall accounting in the con-
tract action between the owners and the contractor. In this 
regard Mr. Nebeker stated: 
Mr. Nebeker: "But the cross-claim is simply to say 
that the determination on how much drywall he 
is entitled to and how much the electri-
cian is entitled to goes into the overall 
accounting ••• " (Supp T.32) 
Thereafter the following dialogue took place: 
The Court: As I understand your response, Mr. Nebeker, 
it isn't really you don't take issue with 
what Mr. Tanner has said " 
Mr. Nebeker: "Sure ••• " (Supp T.33) 
Based upon this representation by Defendants) the trial court 
denied Plaintiffs' motion as follows: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
Anything further on that motion, gentlemen? 
The Court is going to deny that motion with 
the explanation given of course that what 
their intention is and the Court I think 
understands it's merely what they want to 
do and I'll limit it to that at the time 
of trial. 
As I understand the Court's ruling, it is 
based upon the proposition that no such 
claim as I was talking about is in fact 
being made therefor? 
3Mr. Beesley concurred in the representations of Mr. 
Nebeker (Supp T.34-35). 
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The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
R~ght. They don't from their explanation 
glven me, they don't claim any other than 
that entitled to under the contract. 
Thank you. Just want to make that clear. 
(Supp T.36) 
The record shows that Defendants did not intend to pass 
through attorney's fees awarded to the subcontractors. If they 
at one time so intended that position was clearly abandoned at 
the pre-trial. 
Defendants' contention that evidence regarding attorney's 
fees was not presented to the jury is true. This was because 
Defendants were not pressing any claim to fees other than as 
costs under §14-2-3. Judge Hall's finding number 11 makes this 
absolutely clear. The only claim for attorney's fees advanced at 
trial by Defendants or the subcontractors was under §14-2-3 which 
does not contain any provision that would authorize a pass 
through. 
In reviewing the record in preparation of this response 
one additional fact of interest was discovered. 
On August 15, 1975, Comstock and Murray Electric filed 
an Amended Verified Complaint wherein they alleged in Paragraphs 
2-5 that a joint venture existed between Clifford M. Berg, 
William R. Berg and Frank c. Berg and that the joint venture 
was the general contractor on the Incline Terrace Project. In 
response thereto Surety, by answer of December 23, 1975, admitted 
the allegations contained in Murray-Comstock's Paragraphs 2-5 
and only took exception to the stated contract amount (R. C335); 
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therefore, Surety's contention at trial and on appeal that there 
was no joint venture should be precluded by its previous admis-
sion that the joint venture did in fact exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Lignell and Todd 
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